The release of Gilad Shalit is perhaps the ultimate example of the maxim, “ Where there’s a will, there’s a way.” Of course that is true for all sides of the equation. It was in every sense a political decision on both the Israeli and Palestinian side. Like any political decision there are positives, but also negatives with consequences.
On the Palestinian side the timing was as much political as anything else. Mahmoud Abbas had gone to the UN in September to demand a Palestinian state. The Hamas administration in Gaza had no choice, but to seem to support the move, but that tacit support was always tenuous at best. As part of the move to statehood there would have to be a unification of Gaza and the West Bank as well as two governments that have already outlived their 'use by' date. Both governments were democratically elected many, many years ago, but have not faced the people for some time. Hamas were heading to electoral disaster and risked losing their Gazan stronghold.
There is no doubt that the “Shalit deal” has done Hamas no end of good in the eyes of the Palestinian masses and this will make any election very interesting. It reversed the situation of Fatah’s bid for statehood and forced Fatah to give the tacit support behind gritted teeth. The consequences seem relatively minor for Hamas; for all intents and purposes, an easy decision. However there are always consequences to political decisions.
On the face of it and probably in the long run the political decision from an Israeli standpoint is far more complex. I think it is worth trying to understand the Israeli mindset in order to fathom just how complex. Far from the menacing military state with its sights set on conquest of Arab lands that is portrayed in the media we see in Australia, Israelis see themselves as a country under siege. Yes it’s true. I ask the sceptics to put aside their personal view of the Palestinian situation, just for the moment and walk a mile in the shoe of an Israeli.
Israel as a modern country has existed for 63 years and been through 4 major wars and several major military operations in that time. Size wise, Israel fits in Tasmania 3 ½ times and the total population is that of greater Sydney. It is surrounded by 22 Arab and Muslim countries, 18 of whom are still officially at war with Israel, 2 have a long lasting peace treaty with Israel (although the peace with Egypt is possibly under threat now) and 2 gulf countries that have de facto relations with Israel. The fact that much of the world sees Israel as an aggressor in the region increases that sense of isolation. Israelis in the south face the daily threat of missile attacks and of course are targets for terror, but the world seems to see all of this as, if not right, at least understandable.
As a country that was born under threat of war (The Arab world declared war on the State of Israel minutes after it was announced and attacked shortly after), Israel has always had conscription, with all citizens, male and female, serving in the army. I would argue that rather than make Israel a militaristic state (a la Troy) it has created a citizen army. As a democracy, the army is subjugate to the government of the people. Of course the army plays a major role in everybody's lives. It has long been a tenet of the Israeli army, an obligation laid at the feet of the government, that no comrade will be left in the field. That comrade will be someone's son, cousin, nephew, friend, neighbour, etc. Any death is felt like a ripple effect in a country as small as Israel. This is a tenet that allows soldiers to go into battle and parents to let their sons go, with at least a modicum of confidence that they will return safely.
Another tenet of the government of Israel is not to negotiate with terrorists. In the past, these two often conflicting tenets have led to distasteful exchanges with terrorist organisations in order to return soldiers alive and dead, but Israel was always in a position to bargain; and while there have been massive exchanges in the past, the line has been drawn at prisoners with blood on their hands, i.e. convicted murderers/terrorists. The Shalit deal was different and the emotions of the masses reflected the conflict for the government.
The kidnapping of the Beaumont Children in the early 60's, the Tasmanian shooting spree, the Russell St. bombing and Bali are incidents all etched in the minds of Australians. Israelis similarly remember each terrorist attack and each military death. As I said earlier, these incidents go through a small country with a ripple effect; If you didn't have a personal connection to the victim, then there is a good chance that you knew someone who did. On top of that, when it came to victims of terrorism, even if you had no connection to any victims, there was the feeling of "There but for the grace of god……" (or for atheists: "It could have been me")
Gilad Shalit was kidnapped over 5 years ago and secreted over the border to Gaza. Obviously there was internal pressure within the army and government to return Gilad Shalit home, but what symbolized this story was a well managed public campaign to keep Shalit in the public eye from the beginning. A lesson perhaps learned from the quiet approach taken by the family of Ron Arad, captured in Lebanon in the mid 80's. Every so often, awareness of Arad would rise only to fall away to no result. After years of reported sightings and hope, it all ended in the realisation that he was dead. There was a feeling that to a degree, this was a failure of the governments of the time.
"Bibi" Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel is on the right wing of the political spectrum and has always been one of the most steadfastly opposed to any negotiations with terrorists. His brother, the only Israeli death in the daring raid on Entebbe Airport in 1976, was also commander of the raid. The current Minister of Defence (and former Prime Minister) Ehud Barak was second in command of that operation. For these two, any deal over Shalit was a last option.
So how did things conspire to turn this particular political choice into a 'no-brainer'
Even before the Occupy Wall Street Movement, the streets of towns around Israel were filled with "tent cities" of protesters over the price of living, housing costs and well, you know the script by now. Israel continued with the building of new housing in already existing settlements in the face of international calls for at least a temporary cessation. Netanyahu took on President Obama when the latter tried to kick start peace talks. The Palestinian push for UN recognition even further isolated Israel internationally. While playing tough had earned him some kudos among his natural constituency and further in Israel, the increasing feeling of isolation had the electorate worried. The situation in Egypt since the removal of Mubarak from power was, from an Israeli point of view, unstable at best. Egypt, together with the Germans, was involved in the negotiations between Hamas and the Israeli government. Seemingly time was running out on the Egyptian front as well.
Clearly this was the time to make a deal, both for Hamas and for Israel. But could they? Hamas needed a massive release of prisoners with no credit going to Fatah/PA. For Israel and particularly for Bibi it was far more complicated. Any sizeable exchange was always going to be controversial in Israel, but the scale of this deal and the fact that so many of those released had blood on their hands and remained unrepentant about that, meant that this was never going to be an easy or comfortable decision. Moreover it railed against all of Bibi's instincts, not to mention his political constituency. Yet underpinning all of this was the pressure to make the deal was coming from a well-orchestrated public campaign which was backed heavily by the Israeli media. The name of Gilad Shalit was constantly in the public eye (and ear) for the last 2 years. He became a cause celebre, one that most Israelis could identify with and support. It is worth pointing out here that while most Israelis were aware that any deal for Shalit would involve a large number of prisoners being released, they didn't know, or consider, who those prisoners would be.
The push to release Shalit and the keeping of his name in the public's mind didn't just benefit from a public campaign and the media. Israel had also applied diplomatic pressure and so as to make sure that there was a worldwide campaign to release him. Two governments that took it upon themselves to help in the negotiations were the Egyptian and German government. The deal was negotiated by the Germans and the Egyptians as if it were a deal between two governments, with legitimate demands and rights. The Israelis of course regard Hamas as a terrorist organisation. And of course Hamas were negotiating over the release of a soldier that had been kidnapped in a terrorist raid into Israel.
However Bibi, whose brother had been part of the Entebbe Operation, was faced with a massive dilemma. One failed attempt to rescue Gilad Shalit nor did Operation Cast Lead help in locating Shalit and the military and intelligence had no clues. It ruled out a military option.
In agreeing to the deal Bibi Netanyahu knew that this was going to do wonders for him politically, but that it may be a very temporary brush with popularity. While almost 80% of Israelis supported the exchange, it was clear to all that this was an incredibly high price to pay. Not only were 1027 prisoners being exchanged for 1 solitary soldier but also terrorists responsible for the most notorious terrorist acts on Israelis were released. Bibi lost some creditability as a hardliner for having negotiated with a terrorist group and
for being seen as having capitulated to their demands. He also will live in fear of any of those released committing terrorist acts again, a scenario which is not far - fetched. Certainly noise out of the Palestinian camp calling for "another Gilad" (another Israeli captive) and for more kidnappings, throws focus on yet another consequence of this deal. These consequences were known and anticipated as they must be in any deal, however with Shalit there are hidden consequences.
Gilad Shalit is going to be a major political focal point for a long time to come and here I am talking about Gilad the person, not the deal. On his release Shalit was forced into an interview with Egyptian TV. This was arguably inappropriate, but at least confirmed for Israelis, who were riveted to TV's and radios, that Shalit was alive and mentally alert (more than the Egyptian interviewer who asked Shalit why only one video was released of him in his 5 years of captivity, inferring that it wasn't really fair of him). Shalit clearly said that he hoped that his release would signal a push in the peace process. Netanyahu more or less had his hands tied in making the deal and he had no choice but to gamble that Shalit won't become a political foe. Shalit certainly would be a formidable acquisition to either side of the political equation in Israel.
The deal however did not actually represent complete capitulation on the part of Israel. Most of those with blood on their hands are either being sent to other countries (Egypt and Turkey), or if they are from Gaza, they are being released into the West Bank and visa versa. In fact both sides would argue they came out smelling of roses and so far that is true.
In my opinion the most important thing that could come out of this deal, in Israel at least, will be the weight that Shalit will carry on the political scene. I believe it will be “heavy”.
